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Building upon a body of scholarship1 that compares constitutional 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center.  Earlier 
versions of this Article were presented at the Beznos Family Lectures at Michigan State 
University College of Law, where I served as the Beznos Distinguished Professor, and at the 
Jewish Community Center of Metropolitan Detroit.  I thank Harold Beznos for sponsoring the 
lectures, I thank Joan Howarth and Michigan State University for their hospitality, and I thank 
Michigan Supreme Court Justice Stephen Markman for his thoughtful public response to my 
remarks.  A draft of this Article was also presented at a faculty colloquium at Touro Law 
Center, and I thank my colleagues at Touro for their helpful comments. 
 1  See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (rev. ed. 2011); JAROSLAV 
PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004); Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry 
and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REV. 553 (2003); Robert M. 
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); David R. Dow, Constitutional 
Midrash: The Rabbis’ Solution to Professor Bickel’s Problem, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 543 (1992); 
Ronald R. Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1985); Ronald R. Garet, Gnostic Due Process, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
97 (1995); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); 
Bernhard Grossfeld, Religion and Law: Comparative Legal Semiotics, 18 L. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 3, 26 (2012); Gregory A. Kalscheur S.J., Christian Scripture and American Scripture: 
An Instructive Analogy?, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 101 (2006); Sanford Levinson, “The 
Constitution” in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123 (1979); Francis J. Mootz 
III, Belief and Interpretation: Meditations on Pelikan’s “Interpreting the Bible and the 
Constitution”, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 385 (2006); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, 
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation”, 58 S. CAL L. REV. 551 
(1985); Shlomo C. Pill, Valuing Our Discordant Constitutional Discourse: Autonomous-Text 
Constitutionalism and the Jewish Legal Tradition, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 349 (2016); Chaim 
Saiman, Jesus’ Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 97 (2007); Maimon 
Schwarzschild, Pluralist Interpretation: From Religion to the First Amendment, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447 (1996); David A. Skeel, Jr., What Were Jesus and the Pharisees 
Talking About when They Talked About Law?, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 141 (2007); Peter J. Smith 
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interpretation to biblical and literary interpretation,2 and relying on an insight 
from a prominent nineteenth century rabbinic scholar, this Article briefly 
explores similarities in the interpretation of the Torah—the text of the Five 
Books of Moses—and the United States Constitution.  Specifically, this 
 
& Robert W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 693 (2011); Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041 (1999); 
Symposium, Scriptural Interpretation and Constitutional Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 273 (2009); Symposium, Text, Tradition, and Reason in Comparative Perspective, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2006); Steven D. Smith, Review Essay, What Doth It Profit? Pelikan’s 
Parallels, 90 MINN. L. REV. 727 (2006) (reviewing JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE 
BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004)); Emil A. Kleinhaus, Note, History as Precedent: The 
Post-Originalist Problem in Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121 (2000); Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Note, Looking to Statutory Intertext: Toward the Use of the Rabbinic Biblical 
Interpretive Stance in American Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1479 
(2002); Michael Sink, Comment, Restoring Our Ancient Constitutional Faith, 75 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 921 (2004); Harold Anthony Lloyd, Gorsuch and Originalism: Some Critiques from 
Logic, Scripture, and Art (Mar. 5, 2017) (unpublished essay), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927810. See generally SAMUEL J. LEVINE, JEWISH LAW AND 
AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2018); see also Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction 
to Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to the American Legal System, 29 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 916 (1999) [hereinafter Levine, Legislation in Jewish Law]; Samuel J. Levine, 
Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 
465 (1998) [hereinafter Levine, Halacha and Aggada]; Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal 
Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1997) [hereinafter Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American 
Constitutional Theory]; Samuel J. Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory: 
The Constitutional Rule in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 69 MD. L. REV. 78 (2009) 
[hereinafter Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory]; Samuel J. Levine, Of 
Inkblots and Omnisignificance: Conceptualizing Secondary and Symbolic Functions of the 
Ninth Amendment, in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 277 
(2009) [hereinafter Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance]; Samuel J. Levine, Taking 
Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in 
a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003); Samuel J. Levine, 
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary 
Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511 (1998) [hereinafter Levine, 
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations].  Cf. Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A Talmudic 
maxim instructs with respect to the Scripture: ‘Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.’  
Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due Process 
Clause most assuredly does not.”) (citing 8 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SEDER NEZIKIN, 
TRACTATE ABOTH, Ch. V, Mishnah 22, 75–77 (I. Epstein trans., 1935)). 
 2  In addition to many of the works cited supra note 1, some of the groundbreaking 
scholarship in this field includes, for example, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A 
HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); RONALD 
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); JAMES 
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984); Stanley Fish, Fish v. 
Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 739 (1982); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982); 
Richard H. Weisberg, Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. 
REV. 939 (1986). 
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Article draws upon Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin’s (“Netziv”) 
intriguing suggestion that the interpretation of the text of the Torah parallels 
the interpretation of poetry.3  According to Netziv, this parallel accounts for 
the practice of interpreting the Torah expansively in ways that derive 
substantive legal rules and principles far beyond those found in the relatively 
narrow wording of  the text.4  Moreover, Netziv explains that deriving these 
interpretations, which, at times, seem far removed from the literal reading of 
the text, requires a level of technical expertise similar to the skilled literary 
analysis necessary for thorough, thoughtful, and meaningful interpretation 
of poetry.5 
Based on Netziv’s insight, this Article focuses on two methods of 
interpreting the Torah6 and the Constitution7 that may otherwise appear to 
 
 3  See NAFTALI ZVI YEHUDAH BERLIN, KIDMAS HAAMEK, INTRODUCTION TO HAAMEK 
DAVAR.  
 4  See id. 
 5  See id.  
 6  Netziv’s discussion is premised on the biblical depiction of the Torah as a “poem” or 
“song.”  See Deuteronomy 31:19; MAIMONIDES, Laws of Tefillin u-Mezuzah ve-Sefer Torah 
7:1, in MISHNEH TORAH; LEVI BEN GERSHON (RALBAG), Commentary on Deuteronomy 31:19; 
Yissocher Frand, Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, TORAH.ORG (June 7, 2002), 
https://torah.org/torah-portion/ravfrand-5760-haazinu/; Dov Freis, HaTorah Keshera, DA’AT, 
http://www.daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/225-2.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2019); Michael 
Hattin, The Commandment to Write a Torah Scroll, VBM, 
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/commandment-write-torah-scroll (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); 
Jay Kelman, Vayelech: Poetic License, TORAH IN MOTION (Aug. 11, 2014), 
https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/vayelech-poetic-license; Jonathan 
Sacks, Nitzavim-Vayelech (5769)—The Torah as G-d’s Song, RABBI SACKS: COVENANT & 
CONVERSATION (Sept. 12, 2009), http://rabbisacks.org/covenant-conversation-5769-
nitzavim-vayelech-the-torah-as-g-ds-song/; Jonathan Sacks, Torah as Song (Vayelech 5775), 
RABBI SACKS: COVENANT & CONVERSATION (Sept. 16, 2015), http://rabbisacks.org/torah-as-
song-vayelech-5775/; Aviad Stollman, “Your Laws are Songs for Me” (Ps. 119:54), BAR-
ILAN U. PARASHAT HASHAVUA STUDY CTR., https://www.biu.ac.il/JH/Parasha/eng/haazinu/st 
o.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); see also Mishnah, Yadayim 3:5; Avraham ben HaRambam, 
Ma’amar al Odos Derashos Chazal, in MILCHAMOS HASHEM 91; Avraham Rivlin, The 
Parable of Shir Hashirim, YESHIVAT KEREM B’YAVNEH, http://www.kby.org.il/english/torat-
yavneh/view.asp?id=3980 (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Ubikashtem 
Misham, in  ISH HA-HALACHA–GALUY V’NISTAR 119–21 n.1 (1978) (analyzing layers of 
meaning in biblical poetry); Moshe Taragin, Shir Ha-shirim—The Elegy of Jewish History, 
VBM, https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shir-ha-shirim-elegy-jewish-history (last visited Oct. 16, 
2018).  Cf. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on “Eye 
for Eye” and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 539 (1998) (“[T]he Torah, the 
Written Law, is poetry, and the Talmud, the Oral Law, is its prose counterpart . . . .”); Steven 
Shaw, Orthodox Reactions to the Challenge of Biblical Criticism, 10 TRADITION 61, 75 (1969) 
(“[W]hile the Bible may not be ‘just poetry[‘], it is at least poetry.”) (emphasis in original). 
 7  Notably, American legal scholars of differing interpretive views have observed the 
poetic style of the United States Constitution, suggesting that the analogy of the Constitution 
to poetry may appeal to a wide range of legal philosophies.  See, e.g., Albert P. Blaustein, 
Constitution Drafting: The Good, the Bad, and the Beautiful, 2 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 
49, 49 (1991) (“The language of a constitution must satisfy not only the requirements of 
accuracy, brevity, and clarity, but also the test of beauty and inspiration.  It is enough for most 
LEVINE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2019  10:37 AM 
740 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:737 
 
legal documents to contain good prose; a constitution must aspire to poetry.”); Garrett Epps, 
Poetry of the Preamble, OUPBLOG (Sept. 17, 2013), https://blog.oup.com/2013/09/poetry-
preamble-us-constitution-day/; Rob Natelson, From the Heartland: The Constitution’s Poetic 
Preamble, AM. SPECTATOR (Feb. 13, 2018), https://spectator.org/the-constitutions-poetic-
preamble/; see also Valery Giscard d’Estaing, The Calligraphy of History, in DESPERATELY 
SEEKING EUROPE 259 (Susan Stern & Elisabeth Seligmann eds., 2003), cited in Elizabeth F. 
Defeis, A Constitution for the European Union? A Transatlantic Perspective, 19 TEMP. INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 351, 382 n.252 (2005) (“The poetry of a constitution is in some ways the 
calligraphy of history.”); William E. Forbath, Lincoln, the Declaration, and the “Grisly, 
Undying Corpse of States’ Rights”: History, Memory, and Imagination in the Constitution of 
a Southern Liberal, 92 GEO. L.J. 709, 718 (2004) (overserving that Charles Black’s “method 
of interpreting the Constitution was very much like the method of reading poetry”); Charles 
Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751, 
758 (1987); Jeremy Webber, Constitutional Poetry: The Tension Between Symbolic and 
Functional Aims in Constitutional Reform, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 260 (1999).  Likewise, 
scholars of differing political views have questioned the analogy between the Constitution 
and poetry.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 142 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1997); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting 
Law and Music: Performance Notes on “The Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of 
Jews”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1530 (1999) (“[W]e think that the analogy [of law] to the 
performing arts is superior to the analogy to poetry or novels.”); Randy E. Barnett, Book 
Review & Reply, Why You Should Read My Book Anyhow: A Reply to Trevor Morrison, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 873, 883 (2005) (contrasting interpretation of the Constitution and poetry); 
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1129 (2003) (“One may, we suppose, apply a different 
interpretive hermeneutic if reading the Constitution as literature, or poetry, or aspiration, or 
as some kind of eighteenth-century political novel.  But that is not, or at least should not be, 
our enterprise as constitutional lawyers.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Book Review & Reply, 
Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 839, 849 (2005) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)).  For other discussions of the relationship between law 
and poetry, across a broad range of contexts, see, for example, SOLON OF ATHENS: NEW 
HISTORICAL AND PHILOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Josine H. Blok & Andre P.M.H. Lardinois eds., 
2006); EMILY KATZ ANHALT, SOLON THE SINGER: POLITICS AND POETICS (1993); RYAN K. 
BALOT, GREED AND INJUSTICE IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (2001); Bernhard Grossfeld, Poetry, 
Language and Law, in RECHT UND SPRACHE 25 (Thomas Lundmark & Astrid Wallow eds., 
2006); Dennis Kurzon, Poetic Language and Court Opinions, in LAW AND AESTHETICS 240 
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1992); Sidney W. DeLong, The Poetry of Law, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 141 
(2008); Edward J. Eberle & Bernhard Grossfeld, Law and Poetry, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 353 (2006); Bernhard Grossfeld & Josef Hoeltzenbein, Poetic Legal Dreams: Cross-
Cultural Pioneers, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 47 (2007); John C. Kleefeld, From Brouhahas to 
Brehon Laws: Poetic Impulse in the Law, 4 L. & HUMAN. 21 (2010); Anthony T. Kronman, 
Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311 (1999); Alexandra J. Roberts, Book 
Review, Constructing A Canon of Law-Related Poetry, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1507 (2012) 
(reviewing POETRY OF THE LAW: FROM CHAUCER TO THE PRESENT (David Kader & Michael 
Standford eds., 2010)); Richard K. Sherwin, Law and the Poetic Imagination, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 347 (2016); David A. Skeel, Jr., Book Review, Practicing Poetry, Teaching Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 1754 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE JOSEPH, BEFORE OUR EYES (1993)); 
Stephen J. Toope, Cultural Diversity and Human Rights, 42 MCGILLL L.J. 169 (1997); Adam 
J. White, Roberts’s Frost, WEEKLY STD. (Jan. 8, 2015), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-white/robertss-frost; Law and Literature 
Symposium, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 783 (2009). 
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present an anomalous approach to understanding a legal text,8 but which are 
standard and important methods of literary analysis when applied to poetry: 
first, the expansive interpretation of a provision, a brief phrase or, at times, 
a single word, to establish a wide-ranging set of principles and ideas; and 
second, somewhat conversely, the interpretation of a provision, seemingly 
stated in categorical terms, but understood to incorporate qualifications, 
limitations, and exceptions.  In either case, both the Jewish legal system and 
the American legal system accept the authority, if not the competency, of 
judicial experts to understand, interpret, and apply the text in ways that may 
not be apparent, and that may be difficult to accept outside the technical 
practices of biblical and constitutional exegeses.  Finally, and perhaps as a 
further justification for these methods of interpretation, this Article 
concludes with the observation that, beyond their literary forms, the Torah 
and the Constitution share poetry’s design to function as a timeless text, 
susceptible to meaningful application and containing important lessons for 
the foreseeable—and unforeseeable—future. 
II. THE COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The analysis in this Article is premised on the following basic elements 
of a comparative framework between the written Torah and the Constitution.  
First, the Torah and the Constitution serve as the foundational documents 
and supreme law within their respective legal systems, setting the parameters 
for the subsequent development of the legal systems.9  Second, both the 
Torah and the Constitution are relatively concise, and are written in stylized 
literary forms, thus requiring extensive interpretation and application to 





 8  See, e.g., Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 701 (2016): 
[W]e show that constitutional law is in fact subject to special interpretive 
methods as compared to other sources of law, such as statutes and 
common-law precedents. . . .  Textual interpretation likewise looks 
markedly different in the constitutional setting. . . .  [O]ur basic point 
is . . . that the practice of interpreting constitutional language is distinct 
from interpreting other sources of law. 
Id. at 702–03. 
 9  See, e.g., 2 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 479 (A. 
Philip and Muriel Berman ed., Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994) (referring 
to the written Torah as the ”written ‘constitution’ of Jewish law”).  See generally supra note 
1. 
 10  See generally Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory, 
supra note 1. 
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Scholars have identified a number of literary forms and techniques 
present in the Constitution’s text that lend themselves to methods of 
interpretation that are arguably unique within American law.11  For example, 
in a recent article, Samuel Bray has identified the use of hendiadys—”two 
terms separated by a conjunction [that] work together as a single complex 
expression”—within the Constitution.12 According to Bray, understanding 
the function of hendiadys can, in turn, “help us understand the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”13  
Elsewhere, Bray has explored the implications of the constitutional structure 
for the interpretation of the text, noting a ”famous example” of inner-textual 
interpretation in Chief Justice John Marshall’s interpretation of “necessary” 
in the Necessary and Proper Clause “in light of its usage elsewhere in the 
Constitution.”14 
Similarly, as André LeDuc has observed, interpreting the First 
Amendment’s protection of the freedom of the press, Justice Antonin Scalia 
“has suggested that the courts have read the term press as a ‘sort of 
synecdoche.’”15  For his part, LeDuc has argued that “[a] much more direct 
approach [would be] to recognize the pragmatics of implicature[,]” which 
would “capture[] the way context can be analyzed to highlight our rule-like 
conventions or practices that enrich the semantic meanings of utterances and 
texts.”16 
 
 11  See, e.g., Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 8.  Cf. John F. Manning, The Eleventh 
Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1693 
(2004) (“[A]n important intellectual tradition suggests that the Court should approach 
constitutional provisions with greater flexibility than it does with statutes.”); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1321, 1327–28 (2018) (“Through technical meanings and distinctive rules 
of interpretation, the language of the law can affix a more precise meaning to constitutional 
provisions than ordinary language can. . . .  Several pieces of evidence strongly support the 
conclusion that the Constitution is written in the language of the law.”). 
 12  Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in 
the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 688 (2016). 
 13  Id. at 689.  Bray suggests that: 
There may be other instances of hendiadys in the U.S. Constitution, and 
phrases worth considering including “Piracies and Felonies,” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; “Powers and Duties,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 6; “Advice and Consent,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; “necessary 
and expedient,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; “keep and bear,” U.S. CONST. 
amend. II; and “searches and seizures,” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Id. at 689 n.12.  
 14  Samuel Bray, Translating Genesis: Concluding Thoughts on Legal Interpretation and 
Biblical Translation, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2017/08/11/translating-genesis-concluding (citing McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). 
 15  André LeDuc, Making the Premises About Constitutional Meaning Express: The New 
Originalism and Its Critics, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 111, 170 (2016) (emphasis in original). 
 16  Id. at 170; see also Brian G. Slocum, Conversational Implicatures and Legal Texts, 
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Likewise, for thousands of years, the interpretation of the Torah has 
been premised upon the careful examination of the literary forms of the text.  
The Talmud17 cites numerous hermeneutic principles that rely on exegesis of 
both specific words and phrases, as well as broader structural properties of 
the text of the Torah,18 ranging from the intertextual use of the same terms,19 
to the proximity of words or phrases to one another,20 to the number of times 
a rule is enumerated in the text.21  Indeed, under one prevailing account, the 
text of the Torah is interpreted through thirteen distinct hermeneutic 
devices,22 while on a broader level, much of the legal discussion and debate 
in the Talmud centers around competing interpretations of the text.23 
Of the various literary approaches to interpreting the Constitution and 
the Torah, two are particularly evocative of the literary form and 
interpretation of poetry: expansive interpretation of a word or phrase, and 
interpretation of a seemingly categorical term to incorporate qualifications, 
limitations, and exceptions.24 
III. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION 
Although differing interpretive approaches entail different—and often 
diametrically opposed—attitudes toward both the means and ends of 
constitutional interpretation, by nearly all accounts, fidelity to the 
Constitution requires a method of interpretation and application that takes 
the constitutional text seriously.25  In addition, even under narrow 
 
29 RATIO JURIS 23 (2016). 
 17  The Talmud is the “written, authoritative compilation of the oral traditions and 
interpretations” of the text of the Torah.  Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American 
Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 445 n.17.  See generally ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE 
ESSENTIAL TALMUD (Chaya Galai trans., 1976). 
 18  See, e.g., Bernard Rosensweig, The Hermeneutic Principles and Their Application, 13 
TRADITION 49 (1972); 1 ELON, supra note 9, at 281–399. 
 19  See Rosensweig, supra note 18, at 55–58. 
 20  See id. at 71–72. 
 21  See id. at 58–65. 
 22  See id. at 50. 
 23  See Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, 
at 444–68. 
 24  Notably, some scholars who observe, as a descriptive matter, the unique methods of 
constitutional interpretation, still question the justifications for this approach.  See Serkin & 
Tebbe, supra note 8, at 703 (“Does this observed constitutional exceptionalism make sense?  
In fact, and this is our second main argument, there are few compelling reasons to interpret 
the Constitution differently from statutes, regulations, common law precedents, and other 
sources of law.”).  Conceptualizing the Constitution as poetry might provide a response to 
their challenge. 
 25  But see, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (Geoffrey 
R. Stone ed., 2012).  
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interpretive methodologies, ascertaining the correct meaning of the 
Constitution requires going beyond the literal contours of the textual 
language.26  Indeed, one of the most striking elements of American 
constitutional interpretation involves close and careful attention to the text 
of the Constitution, including, at times, an expansive analysis, interpretation, 
and application of the Constitution, to derive rules and rights that are 
understood as self-evident within the scope of the larger constitutional 
scheme. 
As far back as the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized a presumption against superfluity,27 
under which the Court has, at least in theory, accorded legal significance to 
every textual provision in the Constitution.28  Taking this principle several 
steps further, particularly in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, the Court 
has employed an interpretive methodology that sometimes relies upon a 
remarkably expansive reading of the constitutional text to derive broadly 
articulated and understood—albeit often unenumerated—constitutional 
 
 26  Although the term “textualism” has been adopted by proponents of narrow methods 
of interpretation, proponents of broader forms of interpretation may claim, conversely, that 
their approach entails greater fidelity to the text, taking seriously both literal meaning and 
textual implications.  Indeed, the emergence of “living originalism” suggests that divergent 
approaches to constitutional interpretation may present competing claims to a particular label.  
See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).  In any event, proponents of various 
positions might accept or reject the notion of viewing the Constitution as poetry.  See 
generally supra note 7.   
 27  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed 
that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a 
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”).  Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom for 
the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 459, 475 (2012); Eugene Volokh, The Nonredundant Free Press Clause, 
REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 26, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/04/26/the-
nonredundant-free-press-clause. 
 28  The Court’s approach to the interpretation of the Ninth Amendment arguably 
undermines the practical application of this theory.  See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 236–37 (2004) (“[T]o this day courts 
have rarely been willing to rely upon [the Ninth Amendment] when assessing the 
constitutionality of statutes . . . .”); Kurt T. Lash, Three Myths of the Ninth Amendment, 56 
DRAKE L. REV. 875, 875 (2008) (stating that courts are “reluctant to rely on the Ninth 
Amendment at all” and that “the modern Supreme Court has studiously avoided the Ninth 
Amendment despite being prodded by parties before the court to rely on it”); Mark C. 
Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis 
of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 89–90 (2000) (“[N]o Supreme Court 
decision, and few federal appellate decisions, have relied on the Ninth Amendment for 
support.  Indeed, federal courts that have discussed the Ninth Amendment have almost 
exclusively held that it does not confer any substantive rights.”).  Alternatively, though, 
perhaps the Ninth Amendment can be understood to have legal meaning, in the form of 
secondary and symbolic functions.  See Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance, supra note 
1.   
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rights.29 
This method of expansive interpretation, though surely controversial 
and subject to criticism,30 remains widespread, and may be understood 
through a comparison to poetry, in which each word is carefully weighed 
and measured, such that a single phrase—even a single word—is recognized 
as representative of wide-ranging feelings or ideas, well beyond its literal or 
limited meaning.  Indeed, the literary form of poetry requires that the reader 
engage in a close and careful analysis and interpretation of each word, as 
necessary, to gain a full understanding of the broader meaning the poem 
conveys.  Likewise, a proper understanding of the United States Constitution 
may be possible only through a close and careful analysis of each phrase and 
word in the text.31 
Thus, for example, in a number of landmark cases addressing some of 
the most vital and dynamic areas of American law, the United States 
Supreme Court has relied on an expansive interpretation of a single word in 
the Fourteenth Amendment—”liberty”—as the textual basis for an entire 
realm of rights jurisprudence.32  As Justice Harlan put it in Poe v. Ullman, 
 
 29  See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Unenumerated Rights, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 
(2006).  See generally Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated 
Biblical Obligations, supra note 1.  
 30  See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 472 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(characterizing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as relying on “tenuous 
moorings to the text of the Constitution” and criticizing the majority in Eisenstadt for 
“pass[ing] beyond the penumbras of the specific guarantees into the uncircumscribed area of 
personal predilections”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The Court says 
it is the right of privacy ‘created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.’  With all 
deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part 
of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court.”). 
 31  Cf. David Post, Ah, the Poetry of the Law!, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 
21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/21/ah-
the-poetry-of-the-law/?utm_term=.646ac256d869 (“I often used to tell the law students in my 
classes that they should read more poetry, because nothing hones one’s skill at extracting 
meaning from text better than reading poetry, and extracting meaning from texts is one of the 
things lawyers have to do, all the time.”). 
 32  As far back as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court employed a method 
of expansive interpretation to identify and articulate a broad range of unenumerated rights.  
The Court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
[w]ithout doubt . . . not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of 
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men. 
Id. at 399.  On this basis, the Court found that a teacher’s “right . . . to teach and the right of 
parents to engage him so to instruct their children . . . are within the liberty of the 
amendment.”  Id. at 400.  According to the Court, the Constitution recognizes “the calling of 
modern language teachers, . . . the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and . . . the 
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the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific 
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.  This “liberty” 
is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking 
of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right 
to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures; and so on.  It is a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .33 
Likewise, the Court has interpreted constitutional provisions to 
recognize the freedom of association and a right to privacy, both of which 
have emerged as basic elements of the American legal system, but neither of 
which is found in the text of the Constitution.34  As the Court further found 
in Griswold v. Connecticut, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance.”35  For example, the Court explained, “while [association] 
is not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary 
in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.”36 Similarly, according 
to the Court, “[v]arious [constitutional] guarantees create zones of 
privacy[,]”37 recognizing “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms” as 
“lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees.”38  The interpretive method of identifying and 
 
power of parents to control the education of their own.”  Id. at 401; see also Moore v. City of 
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.) (noting that “[t]his Court has long 
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of 
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” thus 
including the right of a grandmother to live with her grandchildren) (quoting Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925) (recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control”). 
 33  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in Moore, 431 
U.S. at 502 (Powell, J.). 
 34  The recognition and broad application of an unenumerated “right to privacy” remains 
an area of contention, prompting Justice Thomas’s recent comment that “[t]he word ‘privacy’ 
does not appear in the Fourth Amendment (or anywhere else in the Constitution for that 
matter).”  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 35  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 36  Id. at 483. 
 37  Id. at 484. 
 38  Id. at 485; see also id. at 484 (finding that the Third Amendment’s protection against 
the quartering of soldiers in a house during peacetime without the owner’s consent represents 
“another facet of that privacy”); id. (observing that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ 
protections of criminal defendants’ rights recognized “the sanctity of a man’s home and the 
privacies of life”) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); id. at 485 
(stating that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
created a “right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly 
reserved to the people”) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)); id. at 484 (finding 
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applying penumbras—which remains highly controversial39—might be 
understood and justified as a literary technique necessary for interpreting and 
understanding a poetic constitutional text.40 
While the Supreme Court has thus applied a presumption against 
superfluity to the text of the Constitution, resulting in careful and often 
expansive interpretation of the provisions and words of the constitutional 
text, Jewish legal tradition has gone further in finding meaning and 
significance in the text of the Torah, according “omnisignificance” to each 
and every word—even to the form of the letters that comprise the words.41  
 
that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination “enables the citizen to create 
a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment”).  On a 
similar note, one scholar has recently suggested that “few concepts dominate modern 
constitutional jurisprudence more than dignity does without appearing in the Constitution,” 
observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has invoked the term in connection with the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.”  
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172–73 (2011). 
 39  See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155, 
2177 (2014) (“To characterize Justice Douglas’s ‘penumbras’ and ‘emanations’ reasoning as 
unsuccessful would be an understatement. . . .  Douglas’s reasoning has struck many 
observers as so far beyond the pale of conventional constitutional reasoning as to defy 
explanation.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1485 
(2008) (characterizing Griswold’s reference to penumbras as “one of the most ridiculed 
sentences in the annals of the Supreme Court”); David Luban, The Warren Court and the 
Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 28 (1999) (stating that “[t]his passage, 
with its penumbras and emanations, is a strange one, and I can attest from personal experience 
that it attracts a great deal of ridicule in law school faculty lounges[,]” but also “attempt[ing] 
to explain this passage and then to defend it”).  
 40  Indeed, Pierre Schlag has offered the pejorative observation that “Justice Douglas’s 
opinion for the Court reads more like an amateur exercise in metaphysical poetry than law.”  
Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1111 
(2002). 
 41  See Yaakov Elman, “It Is No Empty Thing”: Nahmanides and the Search for 
Omnisignificance, 4 TORAH U-MADDA J. 1, 1 (1993) (quoting JAMES KUGEL, THE IDEA OF 
BIBLICAL POETRY: PARALLELISM AND ITS HISTORY 103–04 (1981)) 
[T]he basic assumption underlying all of “rabbinic exegesis” [is] that the 
slightest details of the biblical text have a meaning that is both 
comprehensible and significant.  Nothing in the Bible ought to be 
explained as the product of chance, or, for that matter, as an emphatic or 
rhetorical form, or anything similar, nor ought its reasons to be assigned 
to the realm of Divine unknowables.  Every detail is put there to reach 
something new and important, and it is capable of being discovered by 
careful analysis.  
Id.; see also TALMUD BAVLI, Menachoth 29b; ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH 
THOUGHT 143 (1979) (“[E]ven the most seemingly trivial passages and variations in the Torah 
can teach many lessons to the person who is willing to explore its depths.”); JOSEPH B. 
SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 100 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983) (originally published in 
Hebrew as Ish ha-halakhah, in 1 TALPIOT 3–4 (1944)) (“Our Torah does not contain even one 
superfluous word or phrase.  Each letter alludes to basic principles of Torah law, each word 
to ‘well-fastened,’ authoritative, everlasting [laws].  From the beginning to end it is replete 
with statutes and judgments, commandments and laws.”); ADIN STEINSALTZ, IN THE 
BEGINNING: DISCOURSES ON CHASIDIC THOUGHT 45 (Yehudah Hanegbi trans., 1995) (“[T]he 
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Fittingly, then, the Torah is expressly characterized as a poem,42 drawing a 
direct parallel to a literary form in which each word must be examined and 
pondered in an effort to fully ascertain the various meanings of the text.  
Accordingly, for thousands of years, Jewish legal authorities have applied an 
expansive method of interpretation to uncover and understand the lessons of 
the Torah. 
A helpful illustration of applying omnisignificance in the interpretation 
of the text of the Torah may be found in the prohibition against having meat 
and milk together.43  In three separate places, the text of the Torah prohibits 
cooking a kid—a young goat—in its mother’s milk.44  Operating under the 
presumption that each articulation of the prohibition must teach an 
independent legal principle, the Talmud engages in expansive interpretation 
of these verses, such that the prohibition includes not only cooking meat and 
milk together, but also a second prohibition, against eating meat and milk 
that are cooked together, and a third prohibition, against deriving benefit 
from meat and milk that are cooked together.45 
As another example, the Torah instructs not to engage in melacha on 
the Sabbath.46  Although melacha is sometimes translated as “work,” a more 
accurate legal definition of this term denotes a variety of ritually prohibited 
activities.47  However, the written text of the Torah enumerates few examples 
of activities that are prohibited on the Sabbath.48  Through textual exegesis, 
the Talmud delineates thirty-nine principal categories of melacha, which are 
 
Written Torah needs endless amplification, study, and clarification.  There are infinite layers 
of meaning, depthless beauty, and new modes of experientially living that which was 
revealed.”); see, e.g., Yaakov Elman, The Rebirth of Omnisignificant Biblical Exegesis in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 2 JEWISH STUD. INTERNET J. 199, 199 (2003); Richard 
C. Steiner, Meaninglessness, Meaningfulness, and Super-Meaningfulness in Scripture: An 
Analysis of the Controversy Surrounding Dan 2:12 in the Middle Ages, 82 JEWISH Q. REV. 
431, 431 (1992).  See generally Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance, supra note 1.  For 
discussions of omsignificance in biblical narrative, see Levine, Halacha and Aggada, supra 
note 1, at 485–92; see also SAMUEL J. LEVINE, WAS YOSEF ON THE SPECTRUM? 
UNDERSTANDING JOSEPH THROUGH TORAH, MIDRASH, AND CLASSICAL JEWISH SOURCES 
(2018).  
 42  See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 43  See Levine, Legislation in Jewish Law, supra note 1, at 922. 
 44  See Exodus 23:19, 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21. 
 45  See TALMUD BAVLI, Chullin 115b. 
 46  See, e.g., Exodus 20:10; see also Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American 
Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 445–46, 456; Levine, Legislation in Jewish Law, supra 
note 1, at 922–23; Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 1, at 
85–87.  
 47  See TALMUD BAVLI, Shabbath 73a; 2 ARYEH KAPLAN, Sabbath: Day of Eternity, in 
THE ARYEH KAPLAN ANTHOLOGY 107, 128 (1991) (“[T]he prohibition is not against actual 
labor as much as against ritual work.”).   
 48  See, e.g., Exodus 16:29; Exodus 35:3; Numbers 15:32–36. 
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in turn divided into further sub-categories.49  In fact, the Talmud dedicates 
an entire tractate—one of sixty-three sections of the Talmud—to a complex 
analysis of the laws of the Sabbath.50  Just as the United States Supreme 
Court has developed an entire area of constitutional rights jurisprudence 
based on the interpretation and application of a single word in the 
constitutional text—”liberty”—the Talmud established a central area of 
jurisprudence based almost entirely on the biblical word melacha.51 
IV. CATEGORICAL TERMS SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION, LIMITATION, AND 
EXCEPTION 
Another area of shared interpretive methodology between the Torah 
and the Constitution further illustrates the necessity to interpret and apply 
both of these foundational texts in ways that would otherwise defy ordinary 
methods of textual—even legal—interpretation.  Both the Torah and the 
Constitution include provisions that, although stated in seemingly 
categorical terms, are subject to various qualifications, limitations and 
exceptions.52  Here too, the interpretation of poetry may provide a helpful 
parallel to the notion that a text, albeit absolute on its face, should be 
understood as using a literary form that requires interpretation, refinement, 
and modification. 
For example, the First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no 
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”53  Of course, however, 
American law prohibits murder, and no interpretation of the constitutional 
text would accept, as a defense, the claim that a religion requires its adherents 
to commit murder.  In fact, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the 
Free Exercise Clause does not provide an exception to any neutral law of 
general applicability.54 
 
 49  See KAPLAN, supra note 47, at 133–44; TALMUD BAVLI, supra note 47, at 73a; see also 
BARUCH CHAIT, THE 39 AVOTH MELACHA OF SHABBATH (1992). 
 50  See generally TALMUD BAVLI, supra note 47. 
 51  See generally Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated 
Biblical Obligations, supra note 1.  
 52  See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Textualism on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial Provision, 
the “Petty Offense” Exception, and Other Departures from Clear Constitutional Text, 51 
HOUS. L. REV. 89 (2013).  Cf. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
1499 (2009). 
 53  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 54  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see 
also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights 
in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2010) 
[F]ree exercise of religion is in our national pantheon of rights.  The 
Constitution references it in much the same absolute manner as it does 
freedom of speech.  Yet, it too is highly qualified in practice.  Few, when 
pressed, would deny that some limit on this right is necessary.  Were the 
freedom to practice religion absolute, every person would be “a law unto 
LEVINE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2019  10:37 AM 
750 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:737 
Likewise, the First Amendment instructs, “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”55  Notwithstanding Justice Black’s 
declaration that “no law means no law,”56 the United States Supreme Court 
has long recognized the need to interpret the First Amendment in less than 
categorical terms,57 permitting, for example: governmental restrictions on 
 
himself,” and government would, for instance, be powerless to stop 
someone from conducting a human sacrifice for religious reasons. . . .  
Under the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the First 
Amendment, the right to practice religion is highly qualified in 
practice. . . .  [I]t does not exempt religious individuals from generally 
applicable laws that have a rational basis. . . .  [F]ree exercise, like all 
rights, is highly qualified, whether it is protected by the Constitution or 
by statute. 
Id. at 293–95. 
 55  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 56  See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971); Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (“I read ‘no law . . . abridging’ to mean no 
law abridging.”) (omission in original); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365–66 
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain 
snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the 
words, can neither be searched nor seized. . . .  Rather than using language in a completely 
artificial way, I must conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to 
eavesdropping.”). 
 57  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood 
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”); see also 
Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy 
Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010); Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of 
Constitutional Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1087, 1100 (1993) (“[T]he apparently unequivocal 
command that Congress and, because of the Fourteenth Amendment, state legislatures pass 
‘no law’ abridging freedom of speech has been (sensibly) interpreted to mean that speech can 
indeed be abridged if the state presents a ‘compelling interest’ justifying the abridgement.”); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 59 (1989) (“Justice Black says that 
‘no law’ means ’no law,’ but no one seriously maintains that the Constitution invalidates a 
law forbidding incitement to mutiny on a naval vessel or falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded 
theater.”); Wilkinson, supra note 54: 
While frequently discussed in absolute terms, freedom of speech is more 
limited in practice.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly “rejected an 
absolutist interpretation” of the right on more than one occasion.  Rather 
than treating freedom of speech as an “unlimited license” to express 
oneself, the Court has narrowed the scope of the right by taking 
competing social interests into account. . . .  [T]he First Amendment 
“does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and 
places or in any manner that may be desired.”  That is, freedom of speech 
is a far more limited right than our rhetoric suggests. 
Id. at 292–93 (citations omitted); Eugene Volokh, Which Part of “Make No Law” Don’t I 
Understand?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 26, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/07/26/which-
part-of-make-no-law-dont-i-understand/  
[I]f one is to conclude that the government . . . is so categorically 
restrained by the First Amendment, I think it would take some very 
powerful and clear historical and textual evidence that the First 
Amendment has indeed been understood this absolutely. . . .  [T]he 
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defamation, child pornography, obscenity, fighting words, and “true 
threats”; regulations on speech through time, place, or manner limitations; 
and a broader degree of restrictions on commercial speech.58  Thus, like 
poetry, the powerful wording of the First Amendment text may be read, at 
once, to carry rhetorical and expressive value, but also to require a more 
subtle method of interpretation for its meaning to be fully and accurately 
understood.59 
Similarly, the text of the Torah commands not to engage in any melacha 
on the Sabbath, but there are considerable qualifications here, as well.  
Notwithstanding the legal and philosophical significance and centrality of 
the Sabbath in Jewish thought,60 in the face of life-threatening danger, any 
and all activities otherwise prohibited on the Sabbath should be performed, 
without hesitation or delay.61  Indeed, more generally, virtually any plausible 
possibility of danger to life overrides nearly every competing obligation 
in Jewish law, not only permitting, but mandating, violation of the dictates 
of the competing obligation.62  Thus, the facially categorical textual 
 
history cuts against any such absolutist position, and the text—especially 
given the history—does not actually support that position. 
Id. 
 58  See, e.g., Gertrude N. Levine & Samuel J. Levine, Internet Ethics, American Law, and 
Jewish Law: A Comparative Overview, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 37, 43 (2016) (citing sources). 
 59  Cf. Andrew Tutt, The Revisability Principle, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1113 (2015) 
First Amendment cases tend to invite a special sort of bombast and 
embroidery, a romanticism inconsistent with what the cases 
actually do when the chips fall.  One need only recall Justice Robert H. 
Jackson’s line from West Virginia v. Barnette that “no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion,” or Justice Harlan’s comment 
in Cohen v. California that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” or 
Justice Hugo Black’s assertion that “no law means no law” (even when 
Justice Black joined Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cohen)—to see that 
not everything that is said in a First Amendment case can be taken to 
mean what it says. 
Id. at 1151. 
 60  See, e.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Chulin 5a, Commentary of Rashi; MAIMONIDES, Laws of 
Sabbath 30:15, in MISHNEH TORAH; RAMBAN (NACHMANIDES), COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH 
312–13 (Charles B. Chavel trans., 1973); KAPLAN, supra note 47. 
 61  See MAIMONIDES, Laws of Sabbath 2:2–2:3, in MISHNEH TORAH. 
 62  See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, The Yale L. Rosenberg Memorial Lecture: Taking 
Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to 
“Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1359, 1359 
n.67 (2004) (citing TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 85a-b; MAIMONIDES, Laws of Sabbath 2, in 
MISHNEH TORAH; 2 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 38–49 (Abraham 
Sutton ed., 1992); HERSHEL SCHACHTER, B’IKVEI HATZOAN 14–18 (1997); JOSEPH B. 
SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 34–35 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983)); see also YITZCHAK 
ZEEV HA-LEVI SOLOVEITCHIK, CHIDUSHEI MARAN RI’Z HA-LEVI 12–13 (1998); Samuel J. 
Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 
IND. L. REV. 21, 57 n.151 (2003) (“[N]early every obligation in Jewish law is suspended to 
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prohibition on melacha on the Sabbath—as well as numerous other 
prohibitions stated in categorical terms—are subject to qualifications, 
limitations, and exceptions, once again evoking a poetic form that expresses 
feelings and ideas in absolute terms, but which is understood to have a more 
nuanced meaning. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In addition to their poetic literary forms, the Torah and the Constitution 
share another property of poetry: both were designed to function as a timeless 
text, with meaningful application for the foreseeable—and unforeseeable—
future.  As Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared: 
[A] constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to 
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can 
approach it.  Its course cannot always be tranquil.  It is exposed to 
storms and tempests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen 
indeed, if they have not provided it, as far as its nature will permit, 
with the means of self-preservation from the perils it may be 
destined to encounter.63 
The timeless design of the Torah is even more apparent through its 
Divine origins, its repeated declaration of its own eternity,64 and the 
historical record of its abiding survival and success, for thousands of years, 
amidst storms, tempests, and perils far beyond those contemplated by John 
Marshall. 
Like timeless poetry, the Constitution and the Torah may—and, to 
continue to function at supreme law, must—be interpreted and applied in the 
face of ever-changing circumstances and unanticipated scenarios.  Indeed, 
how do we apply the fixed text of the Constitution, a document that is more 
than 200 years old, to cases involving electricity, credit cards, the Internet, 
cell phones—scenarios that not only did not exist at the time the Constitution 
was ratified, but could not have been envisioned by the framers of the 
Constitution?  The questions are complex, and the answers may at times 
seem elusive.  In addressing these issues, American legal authorities look to 
the text, the principles, and the precedents of constitutional interpretation, 
applying the settled law to new and unanticipated cases.  Over the years, for 
example, Fourth Amendment provisions requiring a warrant to authorize the 
government to conduct a search65 have been interpreted and applied to cases 
 
save a life.”). 
 63  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821). 
 64  See, e.g., Exodus 31:12–17.   
 65  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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involving phone booths66 and, more recently, cases involving cell phones;67 
in cases of thermal imaging devices that can detect activity inside a home;68 
and in cases of Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices placed on 
vehicles.69 
This phenomenon has been even more pronounced in the context of the 
written Torah, which has been interpreted and applied over the course of 
thousands of years, through scenarios unimagined by—and often 
unimaginable to—those who received the Torah, involving new and 
unanticipated geographical, societal, and technological conditions.  As just 
one of countless examples, returning once more to the prohibition against 
engaging in melacha—various forms of activity—on the Sabbath, does the 
prohibition apply to the use of electricity on the Sabbath?70  Applying the 
settled law—the thirty-nine categories of melacha—to new and emerging 
scenarios, some legal authorities prohibit the active use of electricity, on the 
grounds that causing the flow of an electric current is sufficiently similar to 
lighting a fire.71  Others hold that completing an electrical circuit falls under 
the category of “building” a vessel or of “completing” a vessel so that it can 
serve its function.72  Turning on an electric light is considered by many to 
constitute burning a fire on the Sabbath, through the act of burning the 
filament.73  Alternatively, based on the Talmudic principle extending the 
melacha of cooking, to include non-food objects, turning on an electric light 
may thus involve “cooking” the filament.74 
And of course, as technology continues to advance almost daily, further 
questions continue to arise.75  What is the status of a smartphone in Jewish 
Law?  What will be the impact of virtual reality?  Will self-driving cars be 
permitted for use on the Sabbath?  As these questions continue, just as United 
States courts have applied the Constitution to new and emerging 
technologies, Jewish legal authorities will continue to interpret and apply 
ancient texts, laws, and principles to cutting-edge changes in the way we live 
 
 66  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 67  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Riley v. California, 134 
S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
 68  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 69  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012). 
 70  See L.Y. HALPERIN, SHABBAT AND ELECTRICITY: ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES ON SHABBAT (1993); see also Michael Broyde & Howard Jachter, The Use of 
Electricity on Shabbat and Yom Tov, 21 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC’Y 4 (1991); Levine, 
Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory, supra note 1, at 456–57. 
 71  See Broyde & Jachter, supra note 70, at 12. 
 72  See id. at 12–13. 
 73  See id. at 13. 
 74  See id. 
 75  See, e.g., ZOMET, http://www.zomet.org.il/eng/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (offering 
products that afford purchasers modern conveniences while avoiding engaging in melacha). 
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our daily lives.  As such, the Constitution and the Torah take on the qualities 
of a most profound form of poetry, a text that must be carefully read, studied, 
and understood, to serve as an ongoing source of supreme law for the legal 
systems they represent. 
 
